B5005-1 Reasoning: The Phlogiston Theory

THE PHLOGISTON THEORY: If one places a great deal of faith in science’s purported aim of “explaining” nature, then one is left with the task of defending those explanations of the past which explained a great many things and yet were subsequently found to be spurious. The Phlogiston Theory, for example, failed to explain, in a satisfactory manner, a great deal of diverse phenomenon which today is subsumed under the heading of oxidation reactions. Even though the theory had the initial advantage of appearing to explain things by that all-inclusive essence of phlogiston, the prominent short-coming of the theory was, specifically, its failure to really explain anything.

Now, if science has as one of its aims that of explaining things, then this phlogiston theory must be reduced to the realm of non-science. If this can happen to the theory of phlogistons then all theories are vulnerable to a similar fate. In other words, all of science is suspect. And you may safely assert that this is certainly the case. In fact, you may assert that it must always be the case in science: science is an epistemological effort which cannot stand on settled “truth”. Instead, it is an endless search for more accurate, more precise “truth”.

But, where does this leave the scientist? Isn’t he then in a position where everything he believes to be true must be doubted per se? That is, is science reduced to a series of “I think this is so, but I don’t know” propositions? If it is, then how does one make any theory truly credible? What makes a good theory sound if it is always subject to doubt? Isn’t the test one of what can be done with the theory, rather than what cannot be done? Remember: what cannot be done is believing in the theory with complete certainty. Spurious theories fail, not because they fail to explain satisfactorily, but because they have little use in the practical application of science - what can be done with a theory is the crux of the test, not what area can be effectively enveloped with intelligible explanations.

The phlogiston theory, then, fell into disrepute, not because it failed to explain things, but rather because it did not adequately describe things. This adequacy of description is not to be confused with accuracy of description, for, the oxidation/reduction theory which effectively replaced the phlogiston theory is itself subject to correction and amplification: as of the present date the theory is adequate for our purposes, even though it might not fit all cases with some standard measure of accuracy. What made the phlogiston theory so nebulous was an “essence” which was supposed to leave a reaction when, say, a candle was burned or an “essence” which arrived to account for the gain in weight of a burned (oxidized) substance. This dealing with what is now seen as oxygen moving into a gaseous end product (which explains loss of weight in a burning candle) or into a solid end product (which explains the gain in weight in metal oxides - dealing with this “essence” in such an imprecise manner - lead to apparent contradictions: candles lost weight when burned and metals gained weight when burned; the “same” thing certainly could not account for both reactions, so men thought.

As long as men thought in terms of “essences” and phlogistic elements moving into or out of reactions, the area of concentration remained too broad for any practical application. How does one harness an essence? What, for that matter, is the “essence?” It was in answering these questions about essences that the essences were identified as oxygen or oxidation reactants and which, then, limited the context of experimental materials to more amenable procedures. With “essences,” alone, the context, being too broad, would not allow an experimenter to manipulate any of the variables, since the variables always remained indeterminate. Once such things as oxygen or oxidation reactions were recognized, the each reactant could be varied.

B1042-5 Moron Politics: Dumb Mythology & Other Diversions

Saddled With Stupidity:  Sometimes I think about the accepted mythology of Montezuma when the Spanish conquistadors hit the beach in the Sixteenth Century.  The Spaniards were not seen as invading, threatening beings; rather, they were seen as gods bringing the fruition and fulfilment to history.   By the time Montezuma figured out that the Spaniards were not as benign as their fanciful Mesoamerican mythology would have it, it was really too late to resist the conquistadors. Some would blame Montezuma for his failed leadership.  Others would see the corrosive effect of a faulty world-view on a civilization.  I’m going with the dumb world-view option myself.  Montezuma wasn’t a poor leader.  He was just plain stupid in the face of a sharply-evolving reality.

a.    Science:  Failure to see the world as it is - rather than as one would like to imagine it - is really a common problem.  And this impairment goes across many lines of human endeavor.  The young “scientist,” for example, struggles to incorporate the mythology of science into his thinking while he is in college.  Once he masters the jargon of his field of study, he is no longer capable of being a scientist in the truest sense of the word.  Instead, he becomes a perpetuator of accepted and conventional scientific myths.  In other words, he becomes a cheerleader for the staid enterprise of established science.  He becomes part of the welcoming party on the beach when the mysterious galleons sail into view.

b.    Economics:  One of the more durable myths in economics today is that of Keynesianism as an effective countermeasure for economic ennui.  The scheme has been tried repeatedly since Lord Keynes first promulgated the theory.  In every instance it has been shown to be an abject failure.  Every. Single. Instance.  Yet, each new generation of would-be economists is paraded through the Hall of Mirrors in the House of Keynes as if the theory itself were worth discussing and teaching.  It is the economic equivalent of science’s Phlogiston Theory: It sounds good, but it simply doesn’t work.  To be sure, it should be economics’ most pertinent example of Bad Ideas Gone Wild.  It should only be shown as a Bad Example.  It isn’t, however.  Endless lines of academics recount the horrid lessons of Keynesianism that they learned in Econ 101 as if those lessons were true.  But they are not.  Ms. Christina Romer, former chairman of the president’s council of economic advisors, is one of the latest victims of pretending that a manifestly false economic theory has any merit.  Some  believe that Ms. Romer resigned her chairmanship.  I’m of the opinion that she was fired, not for advising a bad public policy, but rather for a fundamental and obstinate stupidity about things economical.  If it hasn’t worked for five-hundred-and-fifty-times, why would anyone think it should work on the five-hundredth-and-fifty-first time?  How many times does Keynesianism have to stub its toe against the end table of reality before it decides to walk around that object?

c.    Politics: A common Democrat myth in today's world might be simply categorized under the heading of "Taxing the Rich."  Many Democrats believe that the rich should pay their "fair share" of taxes, and they propose that the tax rates for the super wealthy should be raised. They explain why those rates should be raised by saying that the super-rich should pay for the deficits that the country experiences in its tax accounts. Yet, when it is explained that if the United States took every single dime of the super wealthy and applied them towards those deficits, those funds wouldn't begin to cover those deficits. The Democrats' counter-argument to that statement is to stare off into space blankly and then to repeat the talking point that the tax rates for the super wealthy should be raised. In other words, they argue by repeating a basic false premise without supplying any further, supporting evidence. Their counter-argument is simply a non sequitur of belief rather than logic.  That the rich should pay their "fair share" of taxes is an article of faith among Democrats. "Fair share," however, is never defined in constructive ways that anyone could discover.   Exactly what percentage of income that should be confiscated from the rich is never stated definitively. Rather, it is always stated in such a way that the amount should be sufficient to eliminate the debt. Notice that the amount is always open-ended.