DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF FACTS:
a. SIMPLE, UNIFIED, & MENSURABLE RELATIONSHIP: Facts are simple, unified statements of the mensurable relationship between one material thing and another. “All real properties of a thing can be expressed mathematically as quantities, i.e., numbers, showing the relation of these properties to other properties.” (Ouspensky, p. 65.)
For example, when we measure a piece of wood and say that it is eight inches long, we mean that the piece of wood holds a mensurable relationship of eight units (or “inches” or “centimeters,” etc.) on a suitable measurement scale (tape measure, yardstick, etc.) to a dimensional extension (or “length”) on the piece of lumber itself. This relationship, which we express as “eight inches in length,” is a fact.
b. QUANTITY, EXTENSION, OR DURATION: Facts can only be expressed in terms of quantity, extension or duration, as follows:
“There are three [quantity] persons in the elevator.”
“Jason has a 34-inch [extension] waist.”
“We’ve been here two [duration] hours.”
c. MENSURABLE ASSERTIONS: Facts are always and only mensurable assertions. If you cannot measure it, it cannot be a fact.
(1) NON-MATERIAL THINGS CAN NEVER BE THE BASIS FOR FACTS: Since non-material things are not subject to enumeration, extension or duration, no factual assertions made about them.
(2) MATERIAL THINGS THAT CANNOT BE MEASURED CAN NEVER FORM THE BASIS FOR FACTS: To state, for example, that “this object is made of plastic” is not a fact: it is an opinion based on certain kinds of evidence. Similarly, it is not a fact to assert that something is “red” or “blue” or any other color, for that matter. Remember, quantity, extension or duration alone form the basis of facts.
d. THE TEST OF A FACT IS MENSURABILITY: If something can be measured (number, dimension, or duration) it is capable of being factual. Emphatically, “reasonableness,” “logical consistency,” “necessity,” or “evidence” do not apply to facts.
e. FACTS ARE ALWAYS OBJECTIVE:
f. FACTS ARE ALWAYS LOGICALLY CONSTRUCTED:
g. ONLY SIMPLE FACTS MAY BE QUANTIFIED: One may say, as a statement of fact, that, “There are nine pennies in the drawer.” But one cannot say, as a factual statement, that, “A water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” because a water molecule is, as we understand it at this time, a complex relationship between two factors. We may say that a given measure of water contains two moles of hydrogen and one mole of oxygen and infer from these facts that water is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. But when we make that inference, there is no factual basis for it. It is merely an opinion. Remember again, only simple, unified relationships can be described as facts
h. FACTS ARE SELF-REFERENTIAL: Facts imply nothing beyond themselves. To state that a piece of wood measures “eight inches in length” holds no implications beyond that fact. Only when facts are arrayed against intentions of usability do these mensurable quantities become relevant. For example, the eight-inch piece of wood might be too short for someone wanting to erect a flagpole. But it may be quite suitable for other (unstated) uses. A scrap of wood in a pile - one that happens to measure eight inches in length - is just a scrap of wood in a pile; it is not the beginning assumption for a chest of drawers or a tomato stake. At the end of the day, it is just an eight-inch piece of wood.
(1) TAUTOLOGIES: Of their very nature, facts are inherently tautologous.
(2) EMANATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE: No brave forays into the unknown are possible for facts. They exist without pretensions beyond their plain descriptions. They are, in a word, ontological.
i. FACTS ARE ALWAYS VERIFIABLE AND REPEATABLE: The relationship found by one person can be duplicated by others and, within some range of acceptable measuring error, the same result can be found by others as well. There is, then, a factual inelasticity about material things that is woefully lacking in mere opinion. When we count the guests around the breakfast table we consistently arrive at the number four without disputing among ourselves whether the poor dear at the far end of the table just might happen to be a moose or a water faucet instead.
j. ULTIMATELY, FACTS ARE TRIVIAL: Since facts are self-referential and imply nothing beyond themselves, they are always trivial in a philosophical sense.
k. A COLLECTION OF FACTS CONSTITUTES A LIST: As facts themselves can imply nothing, so also lists can imply nothing. Lists, sometimes called “data,” are used, however, to form opinions. But the lists themselves do not force a definite conclusion in such a way that, for example, we can say with some confidence, that “ingesting a 5,000 calorie/day diet will make one fat.” Lumberjacks might do that regularly without becoming obese, while the sedentary might well grow to immense size on such a diet. To state, then, that the 5,000 calorie/day diet will make one fat as a “fact” is to misapprehend the meaning of the word “fact.” One will see at once that an opinion is being expressed when one states that a 5,000 calorie diet will make one fat.
l. FACTS, COLLECTIVELY GROUPED INTO A LIST, ARE NOT INTER-RELATED: Facts are intransitive and independent of one another. For example, suppose one counted the number of people entering an elevator at a quarter past the hour throughout an eight hour period. The resulting list, which would show, say, four people entering the elevator at 9:15 a.m., would have no correlation with the three people entering the elevator at 3:15 p.m. These two facts would stand independently of each other. Except in some trivial and co-incidental manner, there would be no correlation between the number of morning and afternoon passengers.
m. THE CONFUSION OF FACTS AND OPINIONS: Science, as a self-styled, mensurable activity, frequently falls into the error of confusing facts with opinions. It often suggests that the data (or list of facts) support a certain conclusion when they do nothing of the sort. The facts are only mensurable qualities without implication for practical use. Let me give an example from real life. A university invertebrate zoology class wished to study aquatic life in a pond on the campus. The students took water samples each Monday morning during the Fall of the year, recorded the water temperature, and counted the types and numbers of diatoms in the water. As they collected and counted the samples, they noticed that certain diatoms began to disappear in number as the water grew colder, while other diatoms increased in number during the same time period. At the end of a suitable period the teacher asked the students to tell him what had happened to the diatoms in the pond.
The more enterprising members of the class postulated that Asterionella grew abundantly in cold water and were, therefore, “cold-adapted.” They made similar claims for diatoms that disappeared except that they said such diatoms were not “cold-adapted.” Where did the students get such notions?
The numbers themselves seemed to suggest just such a conclusion. The students saw a correlation between the bloom of certain diatomaceous species and the increasing coldness of the water. Yet the numbers recorded as facts told only how many diatoms were present on a given date and what the water temperature was on that same date. The efflorescence or decline in diatom count was inferred as a correlative of water temperature (or other factors). But - and this is the important point here - what supported such an opinion? Certainly not the facts. The facts measured the number of diatoms present. But, how can mere measurements suggest a hypothesis? The opinion the students held was a leap of faith of sorts; a belief that the coexistence of certain forms of diatoms with certain temperatures implied a correlation. Yet, consider this: surely, if one saw an elephant in the zoo when it was 20 degrees Celsius and did not see an elephant in the zoo when it was minus 20 degrees Celsius, one could not logically infer that temperature had anything to do with the presence or absence of the elephants. The zoo keepers may have kept the elephants indoors (and out of sight) when the weather was colder.
n. THE MATHEMATIZATION OF FACTS YIELDS UNIVERSAL DESCRIPTIONS OF RELATIONS: It does not yield instantiation or the particularization of instance. Instead, the mathematization of facts often describes the orderly process of nature, i.e., what we sometime term “natural law,” but it does not necessarily describe the “Scientific Law,” i.e, a man-made description of those orderly processes of nature.
a. SIMPLE, UNIFIED, & MENSURABLE RELATIONSHIP: Facts are simple, unified statements of the mensurable relationship between one material thing and another. “All real properties of a thing can be expressed mathematically as quantities, i.e., numbers, showing the relation of these properties to other properties.” (Ouspensky, p. 65.)
For example, when we measure a piece of wood and say that it is eight inches long, we mean that the piece of wood holds a mensurable relationship of eight units (or “inches” or “centimeters,” etc.) on a suitable measurement scale (tape measure, yardstick, etc.) to a dimensional extension (or “length”) on the piece of lumber itself. This relationship, which we express as “eight inches in length,” is a fact.
b. QUANTITY, EXTENSION, OR DURATION: Facts can only be expressed in terms of quantity, extension or duration, as follows:
“There are three [quantity] persons in the elevator.”
“Jason has a 34-inch [extension] waist.”
“We’ve been here two [duration] hours.”
c. MENSURABLE ASSERTIONS: Facts are always and only mensurable assertions. If you cannot measure it, it cannot be a fact.
(1) NON-MATERIAL THINGS CAN NEVER BE THE BASIS FOR FACTS: Since non-material things are not subject to enumeration, extension or duration, no factual assertions made about them.
(2) MATERIAL THINGS THAT CANNOT BE MEASURED CAN NEVER FORM THE BASIS FOR FACTS: To state, for example, that “this object is made of plastic” is not a fact: it is an opinion based on certain kinds of evidence. Similarly, it is not a fact to assert that something is “red” or “blue” or any other color, for that matter. Remember, quantity, extension or duration alone form the basis of facts.
d. THE TEST OF A FACT IS MENSURABILITY: If something can be measured (number, dimension, or duration) it is capable of being factual. Emphatically, “reasonableness,” “logical consistency,” “necessity,” or “evidence” do not apply to facts.
e. FACTS ARE ALWAYS OBJECTIVE:
f. FACTS ARE ALWAYS LOGICALLY CONSTRUCTED:
g. ONLY SIMPLE FACTS MAY BE QUANTIFIED: One may say, as a statement of fact, that, “There are nine pennies in the drawer.” But one cannot say, as a factual statement, that, “A water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” because a water molecule is, as we understand it at this time, a complex relationship between two factors. We may say that a given measure of water contains two moles of hydrogen and one mole of oxygen and infer from these facts that water is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. But when we make that inference, there is no factual basis for it. It is merely an opinion. Remember again, only simple, unified relationships can be described as facts
h. FACTS ARE SELF-REFERENTIAL: Facts imply nothing beyond themselves. To state that a piece of wood measures “eight inches in length” holds no implications beyond that fact. Only when facts are arrayed against intentions of usability do these mensurable quantities become relevant. For example, the eight-inch piece of wood might be too short for someone wanting to erect a flagpole. But it may be quite suitable for other (unstated) uses. A scrap of wood in a pile - one that happens to measure eight inches in length - is just a scrap of wood in a pile; it is not the beginning assumption for a chest of drawers or a tomato stake. At the end of the day, it is just an eight-inch piece of wood.
(1) TAUTOLOGIES: Of their very nature, facts are inherently tautologous.
(2) EMANATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE: No brave forays into the unknown are possible for facts. They exist without pretensions beyond their plain descriptions. They are, in a word, ontological.
i. FACTS ARE ALWAYS VERIFIABLE AND REPEATABLE: The relationship found by one person can be duplicated by others and, within some range of acceptable measuring error, the same result can be found by others as well. There is, then, a factual inelasticity about material things that is woefully lacking in mere opinion. When we count the guests around the breakfast table we consistently arrive at the number four without disputing among ourselves whether the poor dear at the far end of the table just might happen to be a moose or a water faucet instead.
j. ULTIMATELY, FACTS ARE TRIVIAL: Since facts are self-referential and imply nothing beyond themselves, they are always trivial in a philosophical sense.
k. A COLLECTION OF FACTS CONSTITUTES A LIST: As facts themselves can imply nothing, so also lists can imply nothing. Lists, sometimes called “data,” are used, however, to form opinions. But the lists themselves do not force a definite conclusion in such a way that, for example, we can say with some confidence, that “ingesting a 5,000 calorie/day diet will make one fat.” Lumberjacks might do that regularly without becoming obese, while the sedentary might well grow to immense size on such a diet. To state, then, that the 5,000 calorie/day diet will make one fat as a “fact” is to misapprehend the meaning of the word “fact.” One will see at once that an opinion is being expressed when one states that a 5,000 calorie diet will make one fat.
l. FACTS, COLLECTIVELY GROUPED INTO A LIST, ARE NOT INTER-RELATED: Facts are intransitive and independent of one another. For example, suppose one counted the number of people entering an elevator at a quarter past the hour throughout an eight hour period. The resulting list, which would show, say, four people entering the elevator at 9:15 a.m., would have no correlation with the three people entering the elevator at 3:15 p.m. These two facts would stand independently of each other. Except in some trivial and co-incidental manner, there would be no correlation between the number of morning and afternoon passengers.
m. THE CONFUSION OF FACTS AND OPINIONS: Science, as a self-styled, mensurable activity, frequently falls into the error of confusing facts with opinions. It often suggests that the data (or list of facts) support a certain conclusion when they do nothing of the sort. The facts are only mensurable qualities without implication for practical use. Let me give an example from real life. A university invertebrate zoology class wished to study aquatic life in a pond on the campus. The students took water samples each Monday morning during the Fall of the year, recorded the water temperature, and counted the types and numbers of diatoms in the water. As they collected and counted the samples, they noticed that certain diatoms began to disappear in number as the water grew colder, while other diatoms increased in number during the same time period. At the end of a suitable period the teacher asked the students to tell him what had happened to the diatoms in the pond.
The more enterprising members of the class postulated that Asterionella grew abundantly in cold water and were, therefore, “cold-adapted.” They made similar claims for diatoms that disappeared except that they said such diatoms were not “cold-adapted.” Where did the students get such notions?
The numbers themselves seemed to suggest just such a conclusion. The students saw a correlation between the bloom of certain diatomaceous species and the increasing coldness of the water. Yet the numbers recorded as facts told only how many diatoms were present on a given date and what the water temperature was on that same date. The efflorescence or decline in diatom count was inferred as a correlative of water temperature (or other factors). But - and this is the important point here - what supported such an opinion? Certainly not the facts. The facts measured the number of diatoms present. But, how can mere measurements suggest a hypothesis? The opinion the students held was a leap of faith of sorts; a belief that the coexistence of certain forms of diatoms with certain temperatures implied a correlation. Yet, consider this: surely, if one saw an elephant in the zoo when it was 20 degrees Celsius and did not see an elephant in the zoo when it was minus 20 degrees Celsius, one could not logically infer that temperature had anything to do with the presence or absence of the elephants. The zoo keepers may have kept the elephants indoors (and out of sight) when the weather was colder.
n. THE MATHEMATIZATION OF FACTS YIELDS UNIVERSAL DESCRIPTIONS OF RELATIONS: It does not yield instantiation or the particularization of instance. Instead, the mathematization of facts often describes the orderly process of nature, i.e., what we sometime term “natural law,” but it does not necessarily describe the “Scientific Law,” i.e, a man-made description of those orderly processes of nature.
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